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us-china: rare-earth controls vs. military power

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    The Siren Song of Ship Counts

    The headlines are designed to grab you: "China Outbuilding US Navy by Staggering Margin." It's the kind of statement that makes politicians sweat and defense contractors salivate. The Pentagon's 2024 China Military Power Report states the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has over 370 ships, supposedly the world’s largest by hull count. The US Navy? A mere 290 or so. Simple math, right? China wins.

    Except, naval power isn't about counting ships like counting sheep. It’s about tonnage, technology, and where those ships can actually go. That 370 figure is misleading, because it lumps in everything from aircraft carriers to small patrol boats. It’s like comparing the economic output of the US to a country where 90% of the population are subsistence farmers.

    Brent Sadler, a retired Navy submariner at the Heritage Foundation, gets it right: "The way we fight is very different — you can’t just look at the number of ships or munitions and say one side is better. That’s not how naval warfare works." (He’s also spot on about the industrial base needing fixing; more on that later.)

    The US Navy, while smaller in ship count, boasts greater tonnage, endurance, and strike power. Nuclear-powered carriers are the obvious example. China's carriers are still learning to walk, while the US has been running this race for decades. And those Virginia-class submarines? Silent hunters that can park themselves off the Chinese coast for months.

    Beneath the Surface: The Real Advantage

    The real contest, as the High stakes on the high seas as US, China test limits of military power piece points out, is beneath the surface. China's closing the submarine gap, but the US still holds a technological edge. The US Navy has roughly 50 nuclear-powered attack boats. China operates about 60 submarines, mostly diesel-electric. Diesel-electric subs are quieter in some situations, but they need to surface regularly, making them vulnerable. Nuclear subs? They can stay submerged for… well, a very long time.

    The Pentagon warns that by the early 2030s China could have nearly 80 submarines, including up to a dozen nuclear-powered vessels. I have looked at hundreds of these kinds of reports, and the language choice always matters. The word could is doing a lot of work there. It’s a projection, not a certainty. And even if they hit that number, it’s still a qualitative difference. A dozen nuclear subs aren’t fifty.

    us-china: rare-earth controls vs. military power

    The undersea cable situation is also interesting. 95% of global internet traffic flows through these cables. The idea that these could be targeted in a conflict is… unsettling (that's my brief personal aside). It’s a digital front line no one talks about.

    The US also has a trump card: alliances. Japan's undersea surveillance systems, Australian patrols, and the AUKUS partnership are a major headache for Beijing. As Sadler notes, submarines forward-based in Australia are worth three times their numbers.

    The Industrial Elephant in the Room

    Here's where the numbers do tell a worrying story: shipbuilding capacity. China’s commercial and military shipyards have roughly 200 times the overall output capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding base, according to CSIS analysis. Two hundred times! That's not a typo.

    Only a few U.S. yards are equipped to build major warships. Huntington Ingalls and General Dynamics are the big players. During the Cold War, America had more than a dozen producing combatants. The current situation is a strategic vulnerability.

    Sadler is blunt: "We should have been doing things ten years ago." He's right. Three or four administrations share the blame for why we’re in a perilous position today. The issue isn't just about throwing money at the problem (though more funding wouldn't hurt). It's about workforce shortages, fragile supply chains, and inconsistent funding.

    Fixing the industrial base is essential to maintaining deterrence. To deter war, we have to close China’s window of opportunity fast. That means more firepower on unmanned vessels we can build quickly — but also fixing our shipbuilding base if we’re going to stay in the fight. The solution isn't just more ships; it's a more resilient and responsive industrial base.

    The Real Naval Gap: Not Ships, But Shipyards

    The ship count is a misleading metric. The true gap lies in industrial capacity. China could overtake the US in naval power, but only if the US continues to neglect its shipbuilding base. The numbers on shipyard output are the ones that should be keeping Pentagon officials (and taxpayers) awake at night.

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